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Abstract
A large number of BITs concluded by France contain quite a peculiar clause (for instance 
Article 10 BIT with Argentina), which has been recently the object of questionable interpreta-
tions and applications in EDF International S.A. et al. v. Argentina and Mr. Franck Charles Arif v. 
Moldova. Both tribunals allowed the claimants to benefit, through the MNF clause, from 
umbrella clauses contained in BITs with third States. It is argued that neither tribunal has rigor-
ously interpreted the relevant provisions in the basic treaty, nor ensured compliance with the 
ejusdem generis principle. The legal uncertainty that surrounds these provisions is detrimental 
for foreign investors and States alike. Concerned States should consider taking the measures 
necessary to clarify, jointly or individually, the content of these provisions and of the obliga-
tions stemming from them.
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I. Introduction
Within the wide bilateral conventional practice on foreign investment protec-
tion, the overwhelming majority of BITs concluded by France contain a very 
peculiar provision on special commitments undertaken by the host State.1  
As it will be seen further below, this provision may appear at first sight as a 
specific form of umbrella clause susceptible to attract umbrella clauses con-
tained in other treaties through most-favoured-nation (MFN) clauses. However, 
this interpretation appears rather problematic and the qualification of this 
1) See below text note 5.
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provision as an umbrella clause as well as the reliance on MFN clauses 
questionable.
This provision has been the object of two recent arbitral awards and deserves 
the closest scrutiny for at least four reasons. First, annulment proceeding are 
currently pending in EDF International S.A. et. al v. Argentina.2 Second, given 
the large number of BITs containing similar provisions, it may be expected 
that other arbitral tribunals will have to deal in the future with the interpreta-
tion and application of this provision.3 Third, in spite of the two arbitral pro-
nouncements under consideration, the interpretation of this clause remains 
unclear. Finally, this kind of provisions may have important implications for 
the host State, possibly much more significant than it was foreseeable at the 
time of their drafting. This would be particularly the case when such a provi-
sion may have to be interpreted and applied in connection with other BITs 
through MFN clauses.
This short note is not intended to discuss the whole awards at issue, or to 
provide a detailed treatment of umbrella clauses or MNF clauses. Rather, it 
confines itself to analysing the tribunals’ interpretation of the treaty clauses 
under consideration, and exploring the implications of such arbitral interpre-
tations from the standpoint of the host State.
II. A peculiar provision on specific agreements
Most of the BITs concluded by France4 – including Article 10 of the BITs with 
Argentina – contain the following clause on the obligations undertaken by the 
host State with regard to specific agreements:
Les investissements ayant fait l’objet d’un engagement particulier de l’une des Parties con-
tractantes à l’égard des investisseurs de l’autre Partie contractante sont régis, sans préju-
dice des dispositions du présent Accord, par les termes de cet engagement dans la mesure 
2) See below note 9.
3) See below note 4.
4) A tentative list of these treaties, based on UNCTAD database, includes the BITs between 
France and the following States: Albania (Article 12), Algeria (10), Argentina (10), Armenia (9), 
Azerbaijan (10), Bahrain (10), Bangladesh (10), Bolivia (10), Bulgaria (9), Cambodia (9), Chile 
(10), China (9), Costa Rica (10), Croatia (8), Dominican Republic (9), Ecuador (11), Egypt (10), El 
Salvador (10), Equatorial Guinea (10), Estonia (10), Georgia (9), Guatemala (11), Hungary (10), 
Israel (10), Jamaica (10), Jordan (10), Kuwait (13), Kyrgyzstan (10), Laos (10), Latvia (10), Lebanon 
(8), Liberia (10), Lithuania (10), Macedonia (9), Madagascar (9), Moldova (9), Mongolia (10), 
Morocco (10), Namibia (9), Nepal (10), Nicaragua (10), Nigeria (10), Oman (10), Pakistan (10), 
Panama (10), Peru (Article 10), Poland (10), Qatar (10), Romania (9), Saudi Arabia (10), Slovenia 
(10), South Africa (9), Sudan (10), Syria (10), Tajikistan (10), Trinidad Tobago (10), Turkmenistan 
(10), Uganda (9), Ukraine (10), United Arab Emirates (5), Uruguay (9), Uzbekistan (10), Venezuela 
(10), Vietnam (10), and Zimbabwe* (11). All these BITs contain a MFN clause.
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où celui-ci comporte des dispositions plus favorables que celles qui sont prévues par le 
présent Accord.5
The provision in point may present minor drafting variations, like in Article 9 
of the BIT with Moldova, which refers to “nationaux et sociétés de l’autre Partie 
contractante” instead of “investisseurs de l’autre Partie contractante”.
More substantive variations are also to be found. For example, the BIT con-
cluded in 2003 by France with Bosnia-Herzegovina significantly departs from 
the general pattern. Indeed, Article 10 reads as follows
Les investissements ayant fait l’objet d’un engagement particulier de l’une des Parties con-
tractantes à l’égard des investisseurs de l’autre Partie contractante sont régis, sans préju-
dice des dispositions du présent Accord, par les termes de cet engagement dans la mesure 
où celui-ci comporte des dispositions plus favorables que celles qui sont prévues par le 
présent Accord. Les dispositions de l’article 8 du présent Accord s’appliquent également 
dans le cas d’un engagement particulier ayant pour effet de renoncer à l’arbitrage interna-
tional ou de désigner un autre organe d’arbitrage que celui qui est mentionné à l’article 8 
du présent Accord.6
This is an umbrella clause for all practical purposes as through the second sen-
tence the contracting parties have clearly accepted the extension of the proce-
dural obligations contained in the BIT to disputes arising out of specific 
agreements. In other words, the second sentence imposes upon the parties to 
the treaty additional obligations with regard to specific agreements.
It is worth pointing out that Article 9 of the French Model BIT, adopted in 
2006, contains a provision identical to Article 10 of the BIT between France 
and Bosnia-Herzegovina.7 One may wonder whether Article 9 of the 
2006 Model BIT was intended by its drafters as a more sophisticated, but 
5) The English version taken from the 2006 French Model BIT reads: “Investments having 
formed the subject of a special commitment of one Contracting Party, with respect to the 
nationals or companies of the other Contracting Party, shall be governed, without prejudice to 
the provisions of this Agreement, by the terms of the said commitment if the latter includes 
provisions more favorable than those of this Agreement.” Article 10 of the BIT between France 
and Chile reads: “Las inversiones que hayan formado parte de un compromiso especial de una 
de las Partes Contratantes, con respecto a los nacionales o sociedades de la otra Parte 
Contratante, se regirán, sin perjuicio de las disposiciones de este Convenio, por los términos de 
dicho compromiso si éste incluye disposiciones más favorables que aquellas de este Convenio”.
6) The treaty has entered into force on 5 December 2005.
7) At http://italaw.com/documents/ModelTreatyFrance2006.pdf. The English version reads: 
“Investments having formed the subject of a special commitment of one Contracting Party, 
with respect to the nationals or companies of the other Contracting Party, shall be governed, 
without prejudice to the provisions of this Agreement, by the terms of the said commitment if 
the latter includes provisions more favorable than those of this Agreement. The provisions of 
article 8 of the present Agreement shall apply even in the case of a special commitment to the 
effect of waiving international arbitration or designating an arbitration body other than that 
mentioned in article 8 of the present Agreement”.
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substantially equivalent, version of the corresponding provisions contained in 
existing BITs (e.g. Article 10 of the BIT with Argentina), or the expression of a 
new attitude toward umbrella clauses in BITs.
Finally, against the above background, it may be noted that only rarely do 
BITs concluded by France contain a typical umbrella clause. One such excep-
tional example is to be found in Article 2(2), second sentence, of the BIT with 
Yemen, according to which
Chaque Partie contractante s’engage à honorer les obligations qu’elle peut avoir 
contracté relativement aux investissements des nationaux ou sociétés de l’autre Partie 
contractante.8
III. EDF International S.A. et al. v. Argentina and Mr. Franck Charles Arif  
v. Moldova
The dispute in EDF International S.A. et. al v. Argentina, 9 arose out of alleged 
violations of the BIT between France and Argentina, which contains the provi-
sion on “special commitments” (Article 10) reproduced above.10 French claim-
ants invoked the MFN clause contained in Article 4 of the BIT Argentina-France 
in order to benefit from the protection of umbrella clauses included 
in Article 10 (2) of the BIT between Argentina and the Belgo-Luxembourg 
Economic Union11 and Article 7 (2) of the BIT between Argentina and 
Germany.12 They accordingly requested the tribunal to adjudicate alleged 
     8) See also Article 3 of the BIT with Hong Kong, which reads: “Without prejudice to the provi-
sions of this Agreement, each Contracting Party shall observe any particular obligation it may 
have entered into with regard to investments of investors of the other Contracting Party, 
including provisions more favourable than those of this Agreement”. See also Article 3 of the 
BIT with the Russian Federation.
    9) EDF International S.A., SAUR International S.A. and León Participaciones Argentinas S.A. v. 
Argentine Republic, ICSID ARB/03/23, Award, 11 June 2012, at http://italaw.com/sites/default/
files/case-documents/ita1069.pdf. The decision on jurisdiction, rendered on 5 August 2008, has 
not been made available to the public.
10) Text note 5.
  11) Concluded in Brussels on 18 June 1990. The Tribunal refers to the BIT as concluded between 
Argentina and Luxemburg. The unofficial English translation included in the award reads: 
“Each of the Contracting Parties shall respect at all times the commitments it has undertaken 
with respect to investors of the other Party” (the treaty has been concluded in French, Spanish 
and Dutch, all three languages being equally authentic).
12) Concluded in Bonn on 9 April 1991. The award contains an unofficial English translation 
that reads: “Each Contracting Party shall comply with any other commitment undertaken in 
connection with the investments made by nationals or companies from the other Contracting 
Party in the former’s territory” (the treaty has been concluded in German and Spanish, both 
languages being equally authentic).
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violations by the host State of special commitments undertaken by it under 
the concession agreement.
The Respondent State objected to the incorporation of umbrella clauses 
contained in treaties between Argentina and third States because inter alia the 
principle ejusdem generis would have prevented the functioning of the MFN 
clause.13
On this point, the Tribunal laconically concluded that the MFN clause per-
mits recourse to the umbrella clause of third-country treaties as it accords 
investors anything other than those rights which fall within the limits of the 
subject matter of the clause.14 While refraining from interpreting the provision 
on “special commitments” of the basic treaty (Article 10), it postulated that the 
BIT between France and Argentina contains an umbrella clause and that such 
a clause satisfies the ejusdem generis principle with regard to the umbrella 
clauses invoked by the applicants.
The Tribunal eventually found that the Respondent had violated both the 
special commitments covered by the umbrella clauses as imported in the BIT 
and the obligation to ensure foreign investors fair and equitable treatment. 
As a result, the claimants were granted compensation for more than 136 
million dollars plus interest.
In Arif v. Moldova,15 the claimant complained about alleged violations of the 
BIT between France and Moldova, which again contains the peculiar provision 
on “special commitments” (Article 9) referred to in the previous section. The 
claimant also invoked the MNF contained in Article 4 of the BIT France-
Moldova in order to attract the protection of the umbrella clauses contained in 
Article 2 (2) in fine of the BIT between Moldova and the United Kingdom16 and 
Article of II (3) (c) of the BIT between Moldova and the United States.17
The Respondent argued that Article 9 in the BIT between France and 
Moldova cannot be considered as an umbrella clause since it does not impose 
upon the host State any independent obligation to honour special commit-
ments undertaken towards the claimant. It further argued against the incorpo-
ration of umbrella clauses through MNF clauses as the former are procedural 
13) Paras 925 and 926. The other two grounds on the respondent’s objection were, respectively, 
the lack of contractual privity as the contract allegedly breached was not signed by Argentina 
(para 927), and the fact that applying the umbrella clause would have led to the forum selection 
clause contained in the contract, which granted exclusive jurisdiction to the local competent 
administrative court (para 928). On the MFN clauses and the principle ejusdem generis see 
below notes 20 to 22.
14) Para 934.
15) Mr. Franck Charles Arif v. Republic of Moldova, ICSID ARB/11/23, Award, 8 April 2013.
16) It reads “Each Contracting Party shall observe any obligation it may have entered into with 
regard to investments of nationals or companies of the other Contracting Party”.
17) It reads “Each Party shall observe any obligation it may have entered into with regard to 
investments”.
<UN><UN>
T. Gazzini and A. Tanzi / The Journal of World Investment & Trade 14 (2013) 978–994 983
in nature “in that they give an international remedy for a separate undertaking, 
rather than any particular undertaking”, whereas the latter can import into the 
basic treaty only substantive obligations.
The Tribunal agreed with the Respondent that Article 9 is not an umbrella 
clause as it does not guarantee – as a matter of treaty law – the compliance of 
obligations undertaken by the host State towards any specific investor. The 
Tribunal qualified the provision in point as one simply preserving the rights 
previously acquired by foreign investors that would be more favourable than 
those stemming from the BIT.18 It nonetheless held that the MFN contained in 
the basic BIT applies to any kind of substantive obligation under the BIT, 
including umbrella clauses, which were considered as substantive in nature.19 
Eventually the Tribunal found that it was not entitled to decide on the alleged 
violations of special commitments under Moldovan law as these had been 
irrevocably annulled by Moldovan Courts.20 It may also be noted that this 
award does not contain any reference to EDF International S.A. et. al v. Argentina 
or to the ejusdem generis principle.
IV. Most favoured nation treatment
Before interpreting Article 10 of the BIT between France and Argentina, it is 
appropriate to make a few general considerations on MFN clauses and umbrella 
clauses for the purpose of assessing the relationship between them and the 
treaty provisions under consideration. MFN treatment clauses can be found 
across international economic law and may apply to multilateral or bilateral 
treaties. As it is well known, in investment treaties, they impose upon the host 
State the obligation to extend to the investors or investments of the other con-
tracting party (or parties) the best treatment it has accorded to investors or 
investments of any third State.21
18) In para 388, the Tribunal agreed with the Respondent that the purpose of Article “is not to 
guarantee the observation of obligations assumed by the host State vis-à-vis the investor, but 
rather to provide investors with the right to claim the application of any rule of law more 
favourable than the provisions of the BIT”.
19) Especially para 396.
20) Especially para 398.
21) See generally, P. Acconci, ‘Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment and International Law on 
Foreign Investment’, in P. Muchlinski, F. Ortino, C. Schreuer (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of 
International Investment Law (Oxford: OUP, Press, 2008), p. 363; A. Ziegler, “Most-Favoured-
Nation (MFN) Treatment’, in A Reinisch (ed.), Standards of Investment Protection (Oxford: 
OUP, 2008), p. 59. More specifically, on the application of MFN clauses to jurisdictional issues, see, 
S. Vesel, ‘Clearing a Path through a Tangled Jurisprudence: Most-Favoured-Nation Clauses and 
Dispute Settlement Provisions in Bilateral Investment Treaties’, 32 Yale Jour. Int. Law (2007) 125; 
Z. Douglas, ‘ MNF Clause in Investment Arbitration: Treaty Arbitration Off the Rails’, 2 Jour. Int. 
Dispute Settlement (2011) 97; S. Schill, ‘Allocating Adjudicatorry Authority: MFN Clauses as a 
<UN><UN>
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Article 4 of the BIT between Argentina and France reads in part as follows
Chaque Partie contractante applique, sur son territoire et dans sa zone maritime, aux 
investisseurs de l’autre Partie contractante, en ce qui concerne leurs investissements et 
activités liées à ces investissements, un traitement non moins favorable que celui accordé 
à ses investisseurs, ou le traitement accordé aux investisseurs de la nation la plus favorisée, 
si celui-ci est plus avantageux.
The ejusdem generis principle requires that both international treaties – that 
including a MFN clause and that invoked by the applicant – contain a provi-
sion dealing with the same subject-matter.22 According to the International 
Law Commission,
The effect of the most-favoured-nation process is, by means of the provisions of one treaty, 
to attract those of another. Unless this process is strictly confined to cases where there is a 
substantial identity between the subject matter of the two sets of clauses concerned, the 
result in a number of cases may be to impose upon the granting State obligations it never 
contemplated. Thus the rule follows clearly from the general principles of treaty interpre-
tation. States cannot be regarded as being bound beyond the obligations they have 
undertaken.23
Indeed, investment arbitration case law has consistently treated the ejusdem 
generis principle as an indispensable legal requirement for the applicability of 
MFN treatment clauses. In CMS v. Argentina, in particular, the invocation of 
the MFN treatment clause contained in the original BIT with regard to the 
adoption of measures on grounds of necessity (Article XI) was rejected by the 
Tribunal on the ground that the treaties invoked did not contain any ‘Article XI 
type clauses’ and ‘would fail under the ejusdem generis rule’.24
In Impregilo v. Pakistan the applicant invoked the MNF clause in order to 
benefit from umbrella clauses contained in BIT concluded by Pakistan with 
third States, even if the basic treaty between Italy and Pakistan does not 
Basis of Jurisdiction – A Reply to Zachary Douglas’, 2 Jour. Int. Dispute Settlement (2011) 353. See 
also the Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission, contained in the ILC 
Report to the General Assembly (63rd Session, 2011), U.N. Doc. A/66/10, p. 285.
22) In the Ambatelios Case, UNRIAA, 1963, p. 107, the Commission of Arbitration held that a 
MFN clause only attracts matters belonging to the same category of subject as that to which the 
clause itself relates.
23) 30 YBILC (1978-II) Part 2, para 11, p. 30 (footnote omitted). See also OSCE, Most-Favoured-
Nation Treatment, September 2004, available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/21/37/33773085 
.pdf.
24) CMS Gas Transmission Company v. The Republic of Argentina, ICSID ARB/01/8, Award, 
12 May 2005, para 377. In Emilio Agustín Maffezini v. The Kingdom of Spain, ICSID ARB/97/7, 
Jurisdiction, 25 June 2000, para 56, the Tribunal held that the inclusion of dispute settlement 
within the scope of the MFN treatment clause could be accepted ‘without breaching the ejus-
dem generis principle’.
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contain such a clause. The Tribunal rejected the argument by holding arguendo 
that even if the applicant could rely on umbrella clauses through the MNF 
clause, the contract would fall outside their scope of application.25 It is sub-
mitted that the Tribunal, after admitting that the basic treaty did not contain 
any umbrella clause should have held that the ejusdem generis was not satis-
fied and therefore the MFN clause could not operate.
V. Umbrella clauses
An umbrella clause can be defined as a clause through which the contract-
ing parties assume – as a matter of treaty law – additional substantive and or 
procedural obligations with regard to undertakings contained in instruments 
extraneous to the treaty.26 In other words, it extends the protection of the 
treaty to legally binding commitments external to the treaty.
The wording of these clauses and their location within the treaty may vary 
significantly, thus calling for a rigorous interpretation in accordance with the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties (VCLT).27 Although there is no 
generally accepted classification of umbrella clause,28 three categories seem 
undisputed.
The first such category pertains to the most commonly found umbrella 
clause in investment treaties typically providing that “[e]ach Party shall 
observe any obligation it may have entered into with regard to investments”.29
25) Impregilo S.p.A. v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan, ICSID ARB/03/3, Jurisdiction, 22 April 2005, 
para 233.
26) In Bureau Veritas, Inspection, Valuation, Assessment and Control, BIVAC B.V. v. Paraguay, 
ICSID ARB/07/9, Jurisdiction, 29 May 2009, para 141, the Tribunal held that an umbrella clause 
“establishes an international obligation for the parties to the BIT to observe contractual obliga-
tion with respect to investors”. Quoted with approval in SGS Société Générale de Surveillance 
S.A. v. Paraguay, ICSID ARB/07/29, Jurisdiction, 12 February 2010, para 170. In literature, S.W. 
Schill, The Multilateralization of International Investment Law (Cambridge: CUP, 2009), p. 84, 
points out that umbrella clauses create “a separate obligation under the investment treaty in 
question to observe obligations the host State has assumed in relation to foreign investors, in 
particular obligations under investor-State contracts”.
27) Done at Vienna on 23 May 1969. Entered into force on 27 January 1980, 1155 UNTS 331. 
Available at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/1_1_1969.pdf.
28) During the unsuccessful negotiations for the conclusion of a multilateral agreement on 
investment (MAI), two categories of umbrella clauses were considered: (a) “respect clauses” 
making respect for specific agreements a MAI obligation and related violations of specific 
agreements subject to the full range of MAI dispute settlement mechanisms, and (b) proce-
dural provisions granting foreign investor access to MAI dispute settlement mechanisms for 
alleged violations of specific agreements. See Report of the Drafting Group Concerning the 
Protection of Investor Right Arising from Other Agreements, DAFFE/MAI/DG1(96)REV1, 
18 March 1996, at http://www1.oecd.org/daf/mai/pdf/dg1/dg1961r1e.pdf.
29) Article II (2) (c) of the BIT between the United States and Argentina. See also the clauses 
referred to above notes 11, 12, 15 and 16. C.S. Miles, ‘Where’s My Umbrella An Ordinary Meaning 
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Although the construction of these clauses30 as well as their interpretation 
have been the subject of a good deal of controversy – especially in relation to 
which contracts that may fall into its scope of application31 – it is generally 
accepted that violations of umbrella clauses may engage the international 
responsibility of the host State and may be adjudicated under the relevant 
treaty provisions on the settlement of disputes.
The second category of umbrella clauses, less popular than the previous 
one, imposes upon the parties as a matter of treaty law the observance of 
obligations stemming from external legal instruments, without affecting 
the relevant provisions of these instruments on the settlement of disputes. 
According to one of these clauses, which can be found in several BITs 
concluded by Mexico, “[e]ach Contracting Party shall observe any other 
obligation it has assumed in writing, with regard to investments in its territory 
by investors of the other Contracting Party. Dispute arising from such 
obligations shall be settled under the terms of the contracts underlying the 
Approach To Answering Three Key Questions That Have Emerged From The “Umbrella Clause” 
Debate’, in T.J. Weiler (ed.), Investment Treaty Arbitration and International Law (New York: Juris 
Publishing, 2008) 3, p. 7-8, provides a non-exhaustive list of drafting options of this category of 
umbrella clauses.
30) Compare, for instance, Consorzio Groupement L.E.S.I. v. Algeria, ICSID Case ARB/03/08, 10 
January 2005, para 25 (ii), where the Tribunal held that “[c]es clauses ont pour effet de trans-
former les violations des engagements contractuels de l’Etat en violations de cette disposition 
du traité et, par là même, de donner compétence au tribunal arbitral mis en place en applica-
tion du traité pour en connaître”, with CMS Gas Transmission Company v. Argentina, ICSID 
ARB/01/8, Annulment Decision, 25 September 2007, para 95 (c), where the Tribunal maintained 
that “[t]he effect of the umbrella clause is not to transform the obligation which is relied on 
into something else; the content of the obligation is unaffected, as is its proper law. If this is so, 
it would appear that the parties to the obligation (i.e., the persons bound by it and entitled to 
rely on it) are likewise not changed by reason of the umbrella clause”.
31) In BIVAC BV v. Paraguay, above note 25, para 141, the Tribunal admitted that “there is no 
jurisprudence constante on the effect of umbrella clauses, that the subject is one on which legal 
opinion is divided, that the relationship between commercial and sovereign acts of govern-
ment is not free from difficulty, and that each particular clauses falls to be interpreted and 
applied according to its precise wording and in the context it is included in a BIT”. According 
to R. Dolzer, C. Schreuer, Principles of International Investment Law, 2nd ed., (Oxford: OUP, 
2012), p. 174, “the survey of the jurisprudence interpreting the umbrella clause indicates that 
the understanding of the rule remains in a state of flux”. In the same sense, K. Yannaca-Small, 
‘What about this Umbrella Clause’, in K. Yannaca-Small (ed.), Arbitration under International 
Investment Arbitration (New York: OUP, 2010) 479. In literature see, in particular: C. Schreuer, 
‘Travelling the BIT Route. Of Waiting Period, Umbrella Clauses and Forks in the Road’, JWI&T 5 
(2004) 231; S.A. Alexandrov, ‘Breaches of Contract and Breaches of Treaty. The Jurisdiction of 
Treaty-based Arbitration Tribunals to Decide of Contract Claims in SGS v. Pakistan and SGS v. 
Philippines”, JWI&T 5 (2004) 555; T.W. Wälde, ‘The “Umbrella” Clause in Investment Arbitration – A 
Comment on Original Intentions and Recent Cases’, Journal World Trade & Inv. 6 (2005) 183; K. 
Yannaca-Small, ‘Interpretation of the Umbrella Clause in Investment Agreements’, OECD 
Working Papers on International Investment 2006/3, October 2006; S. Schill, ‘Enabling Private 
Ordering: Function, Scope and Effect of Umbrella Clauses in International Investment Treaties’, 
18 Minn. J. Int’l L. (2009) 1.
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obligations”.32 Under this formula, a breach of an obligation stemming from a 
legal instrument other than the treaty continues to amount to a violation of 
the treaty and to engage the international responsibility of the host State. 
However, it does not trigger the remedies offered under the treaty. It remains 
to be seen whether foreign investors could rely, through MNF clauses, on 
umbrella clauses of the first category, thus eluding the clear wording of the 
umbrella clause in the basic treaty. The question, which is reminiscent of the 
most controversial issues surrounding the notion of MFN clauses since 
Maffezzini v. Spain,33 goes beyond the scope of this note.
According to a third type of umbrella clause, which has been included in the 
2004 and 2012 United States Model BIT, “the claimant […] may submit to arbi-
tration under this Section a claim (i) that the respondent has breached (a) an 
obligation under Articles 3 through 10, (b) an investment authorization, or 
(c) an investment agreement”.34
Unlike the two previous types of umbrella clauses, the present one does not 
apply to any obligations stemming from any legal instrument, but exclusively 
to investment authorizations and investment agreements.35 Moreover, it 
grants foreign investors access to arbitration under the treaty for alleged viola-
tions of these instruments, without expressly imposing upon the parties the 
obligation to respect them as a matter of treaty law.
The above suggested taxonomy indicates that through an umbrella clause 
the contracting parties may commit themselves to assume – as a matter of 
treaty law – either or both substantive or procedural obligations in relation to 
specific undertakings.36
32) Article 10 (2) BIT between France and Mexico.
33) Maffezini v. Spain, above note 23. In 2011, the ILC Study Group, see above note 20, para 353, 
concluded that “there was no consistent approach in the reasoning of tribunals that permitted 
the use of MFN to incorporate dispute settlement provisions”. In a subsequent report, it stressed 
that “whether or not an MFN provision [is] capable of applying to the dispute settlement provi-
sions [is] a matter of treaty interpretation to be answered depending on each particular treaty, 
which [has] its own specificities to be taken into account”, ILC Report to the General Assembly 
(64rd Session, 2011), U.N. Doc. A/67/10, p. 127, para 262. For another problematic piece of case 
law relevant to the point at issue, see MTD Equito Sdn. Bhd and MTD Chile S.A. v. Chile, ICSID 
ARB/01/7, 25 May 2004, together with the following commentaries: S. Lopez Escarcena, ‘La 
applicacion de la clausula de la nacion mas favorecida y el trato justo y equitativo en la juris-
prudencia de inversion extrangera. El caso MTD’, 1 Revista Chilena de Derecho (2005) 79; 
E. Mereminskaya, ‘Demandas Contractuales antes los Tribunale Internacionales a la Luz de los 
Appis Suscritos por Chile’, in Sociedad Chilena de Derecho Internacional. Estudios (2010) 38, 
especially 61-63.
34) Article 24 (1) litt. (a) and (b).
35) As defined in Article 1 of the BIT.
36) According to UNCTAD, BIT Treaties in the Mid-1990s, Geneva, 1998, p. 56, umbrella clauses 
have essentially procedural nature as “violations of commitments regarding investment by the 
host country would be repressible through the dispute settlement procedure of the BIT”. In lit-
erature, umbrella clauses have often treated as substantive, see, for instance, S. Schill, above 
note 30, p. 60.
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VI. Interpretation of Article 10 of the BIT Argentina-France
Whether claimants may rely on the clauses under discussion in order to import 
umbrella clauses into BITs containing provisions on specific undertakings 
commonly found in BITs concluded by France – such as Article 10 of BITs con-
cluded with Argentina and reproduced above37 – depends on the interpreta-
tion of the latter provision in accordance with the rules on interpretation 
codified in the VCLT.38
The ordinary meaning of Article 10 is quite clear to the effect that invest-
ments protected by special undertakings between the host State and foreign 
investors (i.e. contracts) remain governed by the provisions of these undertak-
ings whenever the later are more advantageous for the foreign investor.39 This 
is in line with the object and purpose of both the treaty, namely stimulating 
and protecting foreign investment as indicated in the preamble, and of Article 
10, namely ensuring that the BIT is not detrimental to the protection enjoyed 
by foreign investors under specific agreements.
It must also be noted that the term “engagement particulier” (“special com-
mitment” or “special undertaking”) indicates that Article 10 applies to any 
commitment undertaken towards specific investors, both through contracts or 
unilateral acts, but not to commitments of a general character as in the case of 
legislation.40
Article 10 on the contrary does not expressly indicate what happens when 
the BIT offers foreign investors a treatment which is more advantageous than 
that offered by the specific agreement. It is submitted that the incidental 
clause “sans prejudice des disposition du present accord” or “without preju-
dice to the provisions of this Agreement” is to be interpreted as ensuring that 
foreign investors can always rely on the substantive and procedural provisions 
of the treaty to vindicate violations of the treaty.
From this perspective, Article 10 does not impose upon contracting parties 
any additional substantial or procedural obligations. Instead, it co-ordinates 
37) See text at footnote 5.
38) That investment treaties must be interpreted in accordance with the VCLT has been 
accepted by virtually all investment tribunals, including EDF International S.A. et al. v. 
Argentina, above note 9, para 891, and Arif v. Moldova, above note 14, para 387. France has not 
ratified the VCLT, but accepts without hesitation most of its provisions – including those on 
interpretation – as reflecting customary international law.
39) In this sense, with regard to Article 9 BIT France-Moldova, see Arif v. Moldova, above 
note 17.
40) See Enron Corporation and Ponderosa Assets, L.P. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/01/3, Award, 22 May 2007, paras 269-277; Decision on the Application for Annulment of 
the Argentine Republic, 30 June 2010, paras 317-346. In literature, see M.C. Gritón Salias, ‘Do 
Umbrella Clauses Apply to Unilateral Undertakings?’, in C. Binder et al., International 
Investment Law for the 21th Century. Essays in Honous of C. Schreuer (Oxford: OUP, 2009) 490.
<UN><UN>
T. Gazzini and A. Tanzi / The Journal of World Investment & Trade 14 (2013) 978–994 989
the application of the treaty and the application of special agreements. On the 
one hand, it preserves the rights already acquired by foreign investors on the 
basis of special agreements by excluding the application to investment or 
investors covered by these agreements of any disadvantageous treaty provi-
sion. On the other hand, it makes sure that foreign investors can fully rely on 
the treaty whenever it is for them convenient. Yet, claims under special agree-
ments and claims under the treaty remain governed by the respective substan-
tive provisions and settled in accordance to their respective remedies. From 
this perspective, non-compliance with special undertakings cannot amount 
in itself to a violation of the treaty, nor trigger the remedies available under 
the treaty.41
This interpretation is not only firmly based on the ordinary meaning of the 
text of Article 10, which is presumed to reflect that intention of the parties,42 
but is also consistent with the object and purpose of the BIT as a whole, and of 
Article 10 in particular. No contextual considerations or subsequent practice 
appear to affect this interpretation. Indeed, the model BIT adopted by France 
in 2006 in itself has no effects on this interpretation of Article 10 of the BIT 
between France and Argentina, nor of any other identical or similar clauses 
contained in BITs with other States. It may indicate or clarify the position of 
France, but it remains just a model treaty and evidence of the practice of one 
of the parties to the BIT. In itself, it is has no relevance for the purpose of 
Article 31 (3) (b) according to which the interpreter must take into account any 
subsequent practice of both parties in the application of the treaty which 
establishes the agreement of the parties regarding to its interpretation.
If it is accepted that the contracting parties have undertaken no separate 
obligations under Article 10, there are consequently no rights granted to for-
eign investors43 that could be compared to those granted under umbrella 
clauses contained in the BITs with third States. Reliance on the MNF clause, 
whose function is precisely to prevent any discrimination against French 
investors in Argentina (or Argentinian investors in France), appears therefore 
misplaced. From this perspective, the ILC has aptly emphasised that the func-
tioning of the MNF clause presupposes the existence of rights on the same 
41) As pointed out by Y. Banifatemi, A. von Walter, ‘France’, in C. Brown, Commentaries on 
Selected Model Investment Treaties (Oxford: OUP, 2013), 245, at p. 264, Article 10 ‘adopts a “more 
favourable treatment” logic’.
42) In Methanex Corp. v. United States, UNCITRAL (NAFTA), Final Award, 3 August 2005, Part II, 
Chapter B, para 22, the Tribunal held that “the text of the treaty is deemed to be the authentic 
expression of the intentions of the parties; and its elucidation, rather than wide-ranging 
searches for the supposed intentions of the parties, is the proper object of interpretation”.
43) As noted by R. Ago, Second Report on State Responsibility, 22 YBILC (1970-II), Part 1, at 192–
193, ‘the correlation between a legal right on the one hand and a subjective right on the other 
admits of no exception’. The ILC further observes that ‘to each and every obligation corresponds 
per definitionem a right of at least one other State’, 37 YBILC (1985-II), Part 2, p. 25.
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subject-matter in both the basic treaty and the treaty with third States. On this 
score, Article 9 (1) of the ILC Draft Articles on the MNF clause – which was 
referred to by Argentina in EDF v. Argentina44 – reads “Under a MFN clause the 
beneficiary State acquires, for itself or for the benefit of persons or thing in a 
determined relationship with it, only those rights which fall within the limits 
of the subject matter of the clause”.45
A rigorous application of the ejusdem generis principle appears necessary, 
indeed, in order to avoid that the parties to the basic treaty be bound by obliga-
tions they have never contemplated and exposed to claims of alleged breaches 
of such obligations.46 On this point, the position taken by the Tribunal in Arif 
v. Republic of Moldova47 is far from convincing. Having found that the relevant 
provision on “special agreements” does not impose any separate obligation 
upon the contracting parties, the Tribunal should have rejected the incorpora-
tion of umbrella clauses through the MFN clause since there were no rights on 
the same subject matter granted under the basic treaty and the other treaties 
invoked.
The interpretation suggested here, nonetheless, is not irrefutable. It may be 
plausible to argue that Article 10 implicitly states that special agreements are 
governed by the provisions contained in the BIT when these are more favoura-
ble to the foreign investments or investors. From this perspective, Article 10 
would allow foreign investors to invoke the application of advantageous BIT’s 
substantive provisions in dispute related to and settled under special agree-
ments, regardless to the applicable law clause contained in the former. 
Accordingly, Article 10 would embody a concession made by the contracting 
parties and intended to further enhance the legal protection of the respective 
investors. Under this interpretation, it could be argued that Article 10 could pos-
sibly satisfy the ejusdem generis principle for the purpose of activating the MNF 
clause and attracting umbrella clauses contained in BITs with third States.
Under a more temerary interpretation, one could even argue that the term 
“governed” under Article 10 is to be understood as referring not only to the BIT 
substantive provisions, but also to its mechanism(s) for the settlement of dis-
pute. In this case, Article 10 would be the equivalent of an umbrella clause of 
the first category described above.
44) See above note 9, para 926.
45) 30 YBILC (1978-II), Part 2, p. 27 (emphasis added). In the Commentary to Article 9 (1), idem 
p. 31, the ILC further maintains that “No writer would deny the validity of the ejusdem generis 
rule which, for the purposes of the most-favoured nation clause, derives from its very nature. It 
is generally admitted that a clause conferring most-favoured-nation rights in respect of a cer-
tain matter, or class of matter, can attract the rights conferred by other treaties (or unilateral 
acts) only in regard to the same matter or class of matter” (emphasis added).
46) See the position of the ILC above note 22.
47) Above note 19 (with regard to Articles 4 and 9 BIT France-Moldova).
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Although certainly in line with the object and purpose of the treaty, how-
ever, both interpretations are based upon an implication that does not seem 
necessary. Invoking the effet utile principle, in particular, appears misplaced as 
the first interpretation of Article 10 suggested above would not deprive this 
provision of any meaning.48 Quite the contrary, Article 10 would retain its own 
function, namely that of excluding the application of treaty provisions disad-
vantageous to foreign investments protected by special agreements. 
Furthermore, it is submitted that the intention of the contracting parties to 
undertake – as a matter of treaty law – any obligations related to special agree-
ments must be expressly manifested. Such a cautious approach is also dictated 
by the fact that admitting that the contracting parties have indeed undertaken 
any such obligations could trigger the MNF clause and pave the way to the 
incorporation of heavier umbrella clauses contained in BITs with third States.
In conclusion, the interpretation of the clause under discussion remains 
highly problematic.49 The treatment of the question in point received in both 
EDF International S.A. et al. v. Argentina and Arif v. Moldova is rather disap-
pointing. On the one hand, the first tribunal summarily dismissed the objec-
tion raised by the Respondent on the ejusdem generis principle by simply 
postulating that Article 10 of the BIT between France and Argentina was 
indeed an umbrella clause susceptible to trigger the functioning of the MFN 
clause. In so doing, the mere fact that Article 10 deals with “special commit-
ments” was deemed sufficient to satisfy the Tribunal for the purposes of 
accepting the claimant’s invocation of the MFN clause.
On the other hand, the second tribunal convincingly shared the view put 
forward by the Respondent that Article 9 of the BIT between France and 
Moldova could not be treated as an umbrella clause, but nonetheless allowed 
the claimant to rely on the MFN clause to benefit from umbrella clauses con-
tained in other BITs concluded by Moldova.
VII. What next?
The questions related to the interpretation of provisions like Article 10 of the 
BIT between France and Argentina may be expected to rise again in invest-
ment-related disputes. This may occur before arbitral tribunals as well as 
domestic courts when they are called to apply these provisions autonomously 
48) In this sense, with regard to Article 9 BIT France-Moldova, see Arif v. Moldova, above 
note 17.
49) It is interesting to note that K. Yannaca-Small, above note 30, has included the clauses dis-
cussed in this note amongst the examples of umbrella clauses (Annex 1, p. 27), but at the same 
time has maintained that only 4 BITs concluded by France contain umbrella clauses.
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or in the context of invocations of MFN clauses. Indeed, this seems quite a 
likely possibility given the number of BITs concluded by France and other 
States containing this type of clause.50 It appears therefore appropriate to 
explore how such States could reduce the legal uncertainty surrounding provi-
sions like Article 10.
The most efficient manner for the States concerned to contribute to dissi-
pate any legal uncertainty in the matter under consideration would be the 
adoption of a joint interpretation, in the form of joint declarations, protocols, 
exchanges of notes, or any other suitable forms.51 Through a joint interpreta-
tion they would clarify whether by accepting any given clause of the kind in 
hand they intended to undertake, as a matter of treaty law, any obligations in 
relation to special agreements concluded with an investor of the other party 
and, if appropriate, the content of such obligations.
Such a joint interpretation would be binding for the parties52 as expressly 
foreseen in some BITs.53 A caveat is nonetheless necessary. As the parties to 
the treaty and those to the dispute are not the same, foreign investors must be 
protected against the retroactive effects of joint interpretations amounting to 
disadvantageous modifications of the treaty. Although the distinction between 
interpretations and amendments is not always clear,54 foreign investors must 
be given the possibility to challenge the application of what they perceive as 
an amendment to the treaty with regard to pending disputes or disputes over 
50) See the tentative list above note 4.
51) Argentina and Panama, for instance, have exchanged diplomatic notes to the effect that the 
MFN clause contained in the BIT they concluded in 1996 does not extend to dispute resolution 
clauses. The diplomatic notes were referred to by the Tribunal in National Grid v. Argentina, 
UNCITRAL, Jurisdiction, 20 June 2006, para 85.
52) As observed by the ILC, 18 YBILC (1966-II), p. 221, “an agreement as to the interpretation of 
a provision reached after the conclusion of a treaty represents an authentic interpretation by 
the parties that must be read into the treaty for purposes of its interpretation”. A. Aust, Modern 
Treaty Law and Practice, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: CUP, 2007), p. 239, further points out that “[g]iven 
that the parties can agree later to modify the treaty, they can also subsequently agree on 
authoritative interpretation of its terms, and this can amount, in effect, to an amendment”.
53) Article 17 (2) of the BIT between the United Kingdom and Mexico, for instance, reads: “An 
interpretation jointly formulated and agreed upon by the Contracting Parties with regard to 
any provision of this Agreement shall be binding on any tribunal established under this 
section”.
54) On the difficulties to distinguish interpretations from amendments, see the debate pro-
voked by NAFTA Free Trade Commission, Notes of Interpretation of Certain Chapter 11 Provisions, 
July 31, 2001, at http://www.naftaclaims.com/files/NAFTA_Comm_1105_Transparency.pdf. For a 
sharp critique of the Commission interpretation see Second Opinion of Professor R. Jennings, in 
Methanex Corporation v United States, UNCITRAL (NAFTA), available at available at http://
www.naftaclaims.com/disputes_us_methanex.htm. As pointed out by I. Sinclair, The Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties, 2nd ed. (Manchester: MUP, 1984), p. 138, “[i]t is inevitably dif-
ficult, if not impossible, to fix the dividing line between interpretation properly so called and 
modification effected under the pretext of interpretation”.
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facts that have occurred before the adoption of the alleged amendment. It will 
be for the tribunal to establish whether the parties have merely confirmed 
their interpretation of a certain provision or altered its meaning.
When States are unable to adopt a joint interpretation, consideration may 
be given to the appropriateness of issuing unilateral interpretative declara-
tions. Similar declarations are not unknown in investment treaty practice.55 
Although these declarations would not be legally binding per se, tribunals 
could take them into account as potential elements of State practice for the 
purpose of establishing any agreement between the parties on the interpreta-
tion of the treaty provision under Article 31 (3) (b). When no agreement 
between the parties can be established, the declaration may still have practical 
consequences as tribunals may take it into account for the purpose of assess-
ing the legitimate expectations of foreign investors.
The above suggested course of action would inevitably involve a risk that 
the parties would issue conflicting interpretative declarations. Even in this 
case, one could argue that unilateral declarations would anyhow be beneficial 
since both investors and tribunals would be aware of the inconsistent posi-
tions of the parties as well as the difficulties to predict any future arbitral pro-
nouncement on this point.
States concerned with the incorporation through MNF clauses of umbrella 
clauses in BITs that contain ambiguous or controversial provisions on special 
agreements may also be advised to take an initiative additional – or possibly 
alternative – to the previous ones. They can seek joint interpretations or issue 
unilateral declarations with a view of clarify whether the relevant MNF clauses 
apply to provisions on specific agreements.
VIII. Conclusions
In EDF International S.A. et al. v. Argentina and Arif v. Moldova the Tribunals 
allowed the claimants to incorporate, through MNF clauses, umbrella clauses 
contained in BITs with third States. The Tribunals’ reluctance to rigorously 
interpret the relevant provisions in the basic treaty and to ensure compliance 
with the ejusdem generis principle is at least questionable.
55) See, for instance, Note on the Interpretation of Article 11 of the Bilateral Investment Treaty 
between Switzerland and Pakistan in the light of the Decision of the Tribunal on Objections to 
Jurisdiction of ICSID in Case No. ARB/01/13 SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Islamic 
Republic of Pakistan, attached to the Letter of the Swiss Secretariat for Economic Affairs to the 
ICSID Deputy Secretary-General dated 1 October, 2003, published in 19, Mealey’s Int’l Arb. Rep. 
E3, February 2004.
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As recognized in Arif v. Moldova, it is doubtful that the clauses discussed in 
this note, which are contained in numerous BIT concluded by France,56 
impose, as a matter of treaty law, any separate substantial or procedural obli-
gations upon the contracting parties in relation of special undertakings. 
Rather, these clauses are merely meant to coordinate the application of the 
treaty containing them with and the application of special agreements. As a 
result, umbrella clauses included in treaties with third States can hardly be 
relied upon through MFN clauses.
The legal uncertainty that still surrounds these provisions is not beneficial 
either for foreign investors or for States. States, in particular, can be concerned 
that other tribunals, following EDF International S.A. et al. v. Argentina Arif v. 
Moldova, could allow claimants to invoke MFN clauses to incorporate umbrella 
clauses in BITs that impose no separate obligations related to special 
agreements.
As for any international treaties, States remain “the transaction’s exclusive 
and absolute domini”57 of investment treaties. With regard to existing treaties, 
they can contribute to the consolidation of a stable and predictable legal envi-
ronment in the field of foreign investment by clarifying, jointly or individually, 
the content of the provisions they have accepted and of the obligations they 
have undertaken. States would also need to be particularly vigilant when nego-
tiating or renegotiating investment treaties containing these clauses in order 
to make sure that their intentions are translated as clearly as possible in the 
negotiated text.
56) See above note 4.
57) The expression has been borrowed from G. Arangio-Ruiz, The United Nations Declaration on 
Friendly Relations and the System of the Sources of International Law (Alpheen aan Rijn: Sijthoff 
& Noordhoff, 1979), p. 284-285, esp. note 183.
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